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This paper considers supply decisions by firms in a dynamic setting with adjustment costs 
and compares the behavior of an optimal control model to that of a rule-based system which 
relaxes the assumption that agents are explicit optimizers. In our approach, the economic 
agent uses believably simple rules in coping with complex situations. We estimate rules 
using an artificially generated sample obtained by running repeated simulations of a dynamic 
optimal control model of a firm’s hiring/firing decisions. We show that (i) agents using 
heuristics can behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their dynamic returns; 
(ii) the approach requires fewer behavioral assumptions relative to dynamic optimization and 
the assumptions made are based on economically intuitive theoretical results linking rule 
adoption to uncertainty; (iii) the approach delineates the domain of applicability of 
maximization hypotheses and describes the behavior of agents in situations of economic 
disequilibrium. 
The approach adopted uses concepts from fuzzy control theory. An agent, instead of 
optimizing, follows Fuzzy Associative Memory (FAM) rules which, given input and output 
data, can be estimated and used to approximate any non-linear dynamic process. Empirical 
results indicate that the fuzzy rule-based system performs extremely well in approximating 
optimal dynamic behavior in situations with limited noise. Simulations are also performed 
under increasingly noisy. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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The representation of agent behavior is a central issue for any empirical economic 
modeling and much economic theory. The diversity of approaches in the literature shows 
that, even though neoclassical “as if” maximization dominates much of the discussions, the 
issue is far from resolved. This paper considers firms’ decisions in a dynamic setting and 
compares the behavior of a rule-based system relative to an explicit optimal control model. In 
the process, we relax the assumption that agents are optimizers. In our approach, the 
economic agent will use believably simple rules in coping with complex situations and, while 
allowing by “profit-seeking” motives to shape its behavior rules, will not be explicitly 
searching for a model’s first order conditions.  The approach adopted uses concepts and 
methods from fuzzy control theory.   
We compare the empirical performance of a rule-based system relative to a benchmark 
represented by the optimal control solution of a firm’s hiring/firing decisions when facing 
fluctuating product prices and significant adjustment costs starting from an analytic model by 
Dixit (1997). The problem can be approached in two ways: the first is to assume the rules to 
be known based on expert knowledge (in this case of firm managers), while the second is to 
estimate the rules assuming no prior knowledge. In this paper we follow the estimation 
approach because we are interested in three issues: (i) can behavioral rules be estimated 
which replicate “real world” economic behavior; (ii) if rules are estimated, can such rules 
perform “close enough to optimality” to support the positivist economics approach of “as if” 
optimization (Friedman, 1953); (iii) if so, are there situations where the rules-based system 
breaks down and deviates substantially from optimality? 
Our results indicate that, while we are able to replicate optimizing behavior when agents 
face normal circumstances, the model’s outcome may interestingly deviate from the behavior 
of standard neoclassical economic models when the complexity of the environment increases 
relative to what agents routinely handle. Equally important, we show that it is possible to 
estimate behavior rules from data rather than either assume them or try to obtain them by 






Simple Rules and Complex Behavior  
 
We start from an assumption that systemic behavior emerges from the interaction and 
coordination of many agents who learn from experience with limited information. This 
emergent behavior may, or may not, coincide with the positivist view that agents behave “as 
if” optimizing. Our approach is that agents are faced with information as input and then make 
decisions using economic reasoning. We assume that rules can approximate such processes. 
An elegant theoretical justification for the existence and stability of such rules is provided 
by Heiner  (1983 and 1989), who formally characterizes why rule-based behavior appears to 
be associated with a variety of situations faced by agents. Administrative procedures, rules of 
thumb, and social norms all express the tendency of agents to restrict their set of possible 
actions to ensure successful outcomes.  Heiner (1983) defines a reliability ratio for rules, and 
states: “…when to allow flexibility to select an additional action: do so if the actual 
reliability in selecting the action exceeds the minimum required reliability necessary to 
improve performance.” The implication of his findings is that an agent should ignore rules 
that are appropriate only in rare or unusual situations.
1 In general, rules will not cover the 
whole repertoire of available actions an agent could undertake. An agent need only be 
capable of determining when to select particular actions from a limited range of allowable 
alternatives.   
Alchian (1950), in his classic paper “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory”, 
discusses in detail the relationship between observed behavior and uncertainty: 
Observable patterns of behavior and organization are predictable in terms 
of their relative probabilities of success or viability if they are tried. The 
observed prevalence of a type of behavior depends upon both this 
probability of viability and the probability of the different types being 
submitted to the economic system for testing and selecting. 
And on the relation between economic analysis and agent behavior: 
                                                 
1 The approach adopted by Heiner (1983) refers to a single agent but is not limited to an individual. All that is 
required to adopt the approach is an objective (which may be an institutional or economy-wide objective) and 
knowledge about uncertainty; in fact, the author applies the approach to a diverse set of issues at different levels 





… the economist can diagnose the particular attributes which were critical 
in facilitating survival [of a firm], even though the individual participants 
were not aware of them.  
He concludes that the existence of uncertainty is the basis of evolution in that it is driven 
by adaptive imitative behavior.
2 Alchian’s approach is exceptional because it does not base 
its aggregate description on individual optimal action; yet it does not destroy the basis of 
prediction, explanation, or diagnosis.
3 Heiner (1983) also argues that, to determine when to 
select a particular action, “the agent does not require an ability to understand why the 
resulting behavior patterns evolved” and highlights the importance of (i) the probability of 
the right circumstances occurring for an action, (ii) the viability of an action (probability of 
“correctly” responding to circumstances), and  (iii) implicit in his argument, that an action be 
tried (to determine the reliability of such action).   
Rules describe the adaptation of individuals, institutions, or the economy as a whole 
(depending on the level of aggregation of an analysis) only to situations which are relatively 
likely. The plausibility of modeling agent behavior as rule-based and not as consciously 
maximizing is very appealing in relation to the current literature on cognition. Moreover, 
from the point of view of economics, it allows us to bypass the controversy concerning the 
validity of assuming representative agents. Using the framework proposed here for the firm, 
analysis at a more aggregate level need not assume away heterogeneity for the framework to 
be internally consistent. As Kirman (1992) points out in his critique of the representative 
agent (as it is currently used), many interacting heterogeneous agents could give rise to very 
regular characteristics in the aggregate. This implies that, if the regularities are captured 
through rules estimated from “normal” data, these rules may apply only in a neighborhood of 
normality. Even in situations where an abrupt shock occurs, in which case the rules may have 
                                                 
2 Tintner (1941) convincingly stated that profit maximization made no sense when agents have imperfect 
foresight and limited abilities to solve complex problems. His view that agents would make a decision whose 
potential outcome distribution is preferable is exactly true in Heiner’s sense. In the bounded rationality 
literature, Alchian (1950) is associated  with the profit-maximizing hypothesis. In the article, however, he 
agrees with Tintner. In fact, Alchian goes even further and says that, even at the economic system level, the 
profit-maximization hypothesis is invalid because “realized profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of 
success and viability”. 
 
3 One point of departure from Alchian’s paper was the development of stochastic dynamic models (Chow, 






to be revised, it may be interesting to see how normal rules perform under shock (whether, in 
fact, they do replicate actual behavior).
4 In terms of disequilibrium dynamics, following a 
shock, a rule-based model offers more predictive capacity than a neoclassical equilibrium 
model which, by construction, has nothing to contribute in disequilibrium situations.  
We develop a framework that can retain the usefulness of the “representative agent” 
approach because we are interested in a method that can be applied to real-world policy 
questions using empirical models. We realize the importance of interaction between agents in 
determining aggregate outcomes; however, we are also aware that trying to obtain real-world 
scenarios by simulating all the interactions among agents in an economy is a very arduous 
task. The development of such an agent-based micro-simulation approach is difficult given 
the likely existence of path-dependent multiple outcomes.
5 In addition, we assume that 
systemic behavioral rules can be estimated from data. The “representative agent” in our 
context thus embodies the rules associated with a “problem class” incorporating agent 
behavior at various levels of aggregation, without resorting to explicit optimization 
behavioral assumptions. We do not aim to solve the problems faced by agent-based micro-
simulation methods; rather, we circumvent them by allowing the simple rules to be 
associated with aggregate behavior.  
Our underlying objective is to provide an applied framework for recognizing when an 
optimization framework is appropriate, and if not appropriate, provide an alternative tool for 
modeling economic behavior. The problem can be separated into three components: a 
learning method, a mapping between a system’s inputs and outputs obtained using the 
learning method, and a test of how the mapping can replicate the behavior of the system. In 
this paper, while addressing all three components, we focus on how to represent the input-
output mapping in a way that can be interpreted in economic terms and how it performs in 
                                                 
4 This would be a step in addressing the problem referred to by Leijonhufvud (1981) when he characterizes 
general equilibrium theory as modeling systems that always work well and Keynesian theory as modeling 
systems that never work. 
5 At an intuitive level,  individual agents can trigger historical events that modify the state of society (viewed as 
a non-linear dynamic system). While such events are rare, and hardly in the domain of economic analysis, any 
system of micro-simulation of agents that deviates from the optimization approach of neoclassical economics 
and aspires to describe real-world events, will have to deal with the ramifications of “history”. If multiple 
equilibria create problems (from a policy analyst’s perspective) in restrictive, ahistoric settings like game theory 





tracking the true “data generating” process.
6 The learning method is very simple and does not 
presume any mathematical sophistication on the part of agents.  
 
A Rule-Based Model of Dynamic Processes 
 
Friedman (1953) argues that the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is 
comparison of its predictions with experience. Interestingly, Friedman continues by stating 
that:  
… among alternative hypothesis equally consistent with the available 
evidence … relevant considerations are suggested by the criteria of 
“simplicity” and “fruitfulness”. A theory is “simpler” the less the initial 
knowledge to make  predictions … [and] it is more “fruitful” the more precise 
the resulting prediction, the wider the area within which the theory yields 
predictions, and the more additional lines for further research it suggests. 
In this paper we perform a “thought experiment” of the following kind: we first show that 
agents (firms) using behavior rules, or heuristics, can perform tasks as if they were seeking 
rationally to maximize their returns (discounted profits). This is done by using an artificially 
generated sample obtained by running repeated simulations of an optimal control 
representation of a firm’s dynamic hiring/firing decisions. Having established that the rule-
based and the as-if hypotheses are equally consistent with the data (the latter is valid because 
of how the sample is generated), we then continue by demonstrating that the behavior rule 
approach is “simple” and “fruitful”. 
The ongoing debate about modeling the behavior of economic agents can be roughly 
represented as lying between two extremes. On one side the dominant strand of literature 
relies on  “representative agent” models in which the behavior of a system is determined by 
the solution of an optimization problem for an “average” agent in the model. On the other 
hand, the new literature on “artificial adaptive agents” represents the economy as a network 
of interacting agents having limited ability to process information (Leijonhufvud, 1993).  In 
between these two extremes there is the rapidly evolving literature on bounded rationality:  
                                                 
6 The economic interpretability is an important component in a modeling framework and one that is lacking in 






(i) “satisficing” where agents perform limited searches accepting the first 
satisfactory decision (Simon, 1955; Day and Tinney, 1968; Winter 1971) 
(ii) suboptimization: an optimizing agent facing a difficult decision solves a 
simpler approximate optimization problem rather than the formally correct, 
but more difficult problem (Day, 1963; Day and Cigno, 1978) 
(iii) heuristics: adoption of rules of thumb; in economics references are Winter 
(1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1987), Thaler (1988), Arthur (1994).  
(iv) institutional processes: the existence and behavior of economic institutions 
depends on the need to economize on transaction costs (Williamson, 1986)   
(v) evolution of markets: survival of “as if” firms (Winter,1971; Conlisk, 1983) 
(vi) classifier systems: agents choose among a discrete list of actions and they 
learn through trial-and-error, associating probability weights to actions based 
on historical rewards (Holland and Miller, 1991) 
(vii) deliberation costs: model the trade-off between effort devoted to deliberation 
and that devoted to other activities. 
Conlisk (1996) provides an in-depth review of the different treatments of bounded 
rationality. The method to be presented here relaxes the assumption that agents are 
optimizers without precluding the artifice of a representative agent and falls under the rubric 
of “heuristics”. However, it can also be viewed as a model-free approximation of the agent-
environment interaction in a dynamic system with underlying unknown equations of motion. 
It is widely accepted that economic agents adapt to their environment and the stimuli they 
receive in the form of information; however, how to represent such adaptive processes is 
subject to heated debate. Several engineering and scientific disciplines, ranging from cultural 
anthropology to neurobiology, study how adaptive systems respond to stimuli. The approach 
taken by electrical engineers is based on a dynamical systems representation and branches 
into non-linear filtering, coding theory, and adaptive control. A relatively recent 
development, of interest to economics, has been the onset of neural networks and fuzzy 
systems as broad classes of “machine-intelligent” adaptive systems. 
The approach adopted in this paper uses concepts from fuzzy control theory. An agent, 





neighborhoods of “fuzzy” inputs to neighborhoods of “fuzzy” outputs, where fuzziness is 
defined by the degree of membership to more than one magnitude neighborhood (e.g. high, 
medium, low). Given input and output data, a set of rules (expressed by appropriate 
operations on the membership functions associated with each neighborhood) can be used to 
approximate any non-linear dynamic process. In general a FAM system encodes and 
processes in parallel a FAM bank of m rules. Each input to the FAM system activates each 
stored rule to a different degree. The output is determined by a weighted average of each rule 
output based on relative activation of the different rules. The rules can be determined a 
priori, based on expert knowledge, or they can be identified by adopting unsupervised 
learning algorithms. The mathematics involved, which is well laid out in Kosko (1992), 
maintains the flexibility of linguistic description while giving a consistent theoretical 
structure and empirical solution techniques.  
The framework we are adopting is similar, in some respects, to Classifier Systems (CS) 
(Holland and Miller, 1991). Agents’ FAM rules are fired in parallel and the outcome is based 
on the output value membership (strength) associated with the input values.  The 
fundamental difference between the two methods is that classifier systems choose a single 
action based on probability weights while FAM rules all activate to different degrees, thereby 
defining a spectrum of actions through averaging the rule activation. The implication of this 
difference is that, in contrast to fuzzy systems, CS systems always need many interacting 
agents to obtain a meaningful result (because they are tied to trials based on the probability 
weights). The analog of the adaptive component of CS is the adaptive FAM, which uses a 
product-space clustering procedure borrowed from neural network theory (adaptive vector 
quantization) that can weigh rules and discover new ones as the system evolves. In principle 
this approach could also be applied in the simulation of many interacting agents, as is done 
with the CS approach, but whether this would be computationally efficient is an open 
question. 
Neural networks and fuzzy systems both estimate input-output functions, and both are 
trainable dynamical systems. Sample data shapes their reaction to input variables; however, 
unlike classical statistical estimators, they are model-free estimators in that they estimate a 





systems encode sampled information in a parallel-distributed numerical framework.
7 
Artificial neural networks, consisting of numerous, simple processing units programmed for 
global computation, have been applied to  economics (Beltratti, 1996; Kaastra and Boyd, 
1996; Rydygier, 1997). 
Neural and fuzzy systems differ in how they associatively “infer”, or map, inputs to 
outputs. Structured knowledge is represented in neural networks by a system of nonlinear 
functions that does not allow any interpretation of what was encoded during training. Unlike 
a language-based expert system, we cannot know which inferential paths a network uses to 
reach a given output. It appears that the price to be paid for model-free estimation with neural 
networks is system inscrutability. In the domain of economic policy analysis, presenting 
results without the theoretical intuition that goes with those results is considered 
unacceptable – the infamous “black box” syndrome of many simulation models. In contrast, 
fuzzy systems encode data in a format that can be easily interpreted linguistically (even 
though the method is numerical) and allow analysts to follow the inferential process. Before 
moving to the applied part of this paper, we introduce some mathematics of fuzzy systems. 
 
Fuzzy Sets  
Fuzzy system theory holds that all things are a matter of degree. A fuzzy set incorporates 
ambiguity.
8  At the heart of a fuzzy set is the violation of traditional laws of set theory such 
as non-contradiction {not-(A and not-A)} and the law of excluded middle {either A or not-
A}. Mathematically, fuzziness means multivalence and was first developed formally in the 
1920s by polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz (1970) by introducing a three-valued logical 
system and further extending the range of truth values {0,1/2,1} to all numbers in [0,1].
9 
                                                 
7 This sets these two methods apart from purely linguistic descriptions commonly used in artificial intelligence 
applications. The difference is important because, in symbolic processing, logical inference replaces time 
evolution and non-linear dynamics. 
8 A distinction has to be made between randomness, that describes the uncertainty surrounding the occurrence 
of a well-defined, and event ambiguity describing the degree to which an event occurs. Randomness and 
fuzziness differ conceptually and theoretically; however, they also share many similarities. Both systems 
describe uncertainty numerically in the unit interval [0,1] and they combine sets and propositions associatively, 
commutatively, and distributively. See Kosko (1992), chapter 7, “Fuzziness vs. Probability”.  
9 Bertrand Russell (1923) first identified vagueness at the level of symbolic logic by analyzing classical 
paradoxes. He also arrived at a paradox of classical set theory that the set of all sets cannot itself be a set. A 





Although multi-valued logic had never, until recently, been used in economics, researchers 
well known in the economic arena such as Von Neumann (Birkhoff and Von Neumann, 
1936) and Richard Bellman (Bellman et al., 1966) contributed in the development of fuzzy 
set theory applied, respectively, to quantum mechanics and pattern classification. 
In classical sets (or crisp sets), as represented by Venn diagrams, the process by which 
individuals from the universal set X  are determined to be either members or non-members of 
a set can be defined by a discrimination function.  For a given set A, this function assigns a 














Thus, the function maps elements of the universal set to the set containing 0 and 1: 
():{0,1} A xX m ﬁ  
 Defining the operations of union (¨ ), intersection (˙ ), and complement ( A ) the 
following well-known properties can be obtained:  AAX ¨=  (law of excluded middle) and 
AA ˙=˘  (law of non-contradiction). 
On the other hand, a fuzzy set contains elements that have varying degrees of membership 
in the set and that can also be members of other fuzzy sets in the same universe.  Elements of 
a fuzzy set are mapped to a universe of membership values using a function-theoretic form. 
This membership function,  A m  maps elements of a fuzzy set A to a real numbered value on 
the interval [0,1], or equivalently: 





A common membership function, often used in applications, is the triangular set shown in 
Figure 1.  




              x  
Figure 1. A possible membership function representation of a fuzzy set 
 
Zadeh (1965) defines fuzzy set operations, which we can compare with operations on  crisp 
sets:  
Union   ()max[(),()] ABAB xxx mmm ¨ =        (2) 
Intersection  ()min[(),()] ABAB xxx mmm ˙ =        (3) 
Complement  ()1() A A xx mm =-         (4) 
With these definitions, all properties of crisp sets (associativity, distributivity, transitivity, 
identity, idempotency, involution, and De Morgan’s laws) apply to fuzzy sets except the law 
of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction (Klir and Folger, 1988).
10 
 
From sets to inference  
 The next step is to define a procedure that will support inferential processes using fuzzy 
sets. To do this we must introduce the notion of relation, a basic idea behind numerous 
operations on sets such as Cartesian products, that may represent the presence or absence of 
association, interaction, or interconnectedness between the elements of two or more fuzzy 
sets. Relations represent mappings for sets and are also very useful in representing 
connectives in logic. It is exactly these two characteristics of relations that will prove the 
usefulness of the fuzzy system approach. On the one hand, mappings between sets can be 
treated as numerical constructs adhering to set-theoretic laws (mathematical functions being 
a sub-case of this approach),  while on the other hand, a relation, R(X,Y),  may be viewed as 
                                                 
10 Note that when the range of membership grades is restricted to the set {0,1} these functions perform exactly 







an implication operation where an antecedent infers a consequent R(X,Y)= X￿Y , allowing 
a logical interpretation of the mapping (at the set level this would be represented as  XY ￿ ).   
Assume X to be the input set and Y to be the output set, a crisp binary relation R(X,Y) 
among these two sets can be expressed as a subset of the Cartesian product space X x Y.  














Similarly to how we defined fuzzy sets, we can define a fuzzy relation as a fuzzy set 
defined  on the Cartesian product of crisp sets X x Y, where tuples (x,y) may have varying 
degrees of membership  within the relation. The membership grade is usually represented by 
a real number in the [0,1] interval and indicates the strength of the relation present between 
the elements of the tuple. 
One possible implication operation, called correlation-product encoding, assumes that the 
degree of membership within an implication relation for fuzzy sets is given by the product of 
the separate memberships:  (,)()() RAB xyxy mmm =￿ . This inferential procedure, commonly 
adopted in the fuzzy systems approach to engineering control problems, has the advantage 
over other methods of preserving more information (Kosko, 1992, p. 312).  This is a crucial 
component of the Fuzzy Associative Memory  (FAM) scheme. The FAM is a rule-based 
system that can provide an accurate numerical approximation of a dynamic system. 
 Fuzzy sets form the building blocks for fuzzy if-then rules such as “If unemployment 
is high then set a low interest rate”. The rules have the form “If X is A then Y is B” where A 
and B are fuzzy sets. A fuzzy system is a set of fuzzy rules that converts crisp inputs into 
crisp outputs. This is done in five steps:  
(i) Universe of discourse specification. The input and output variables X and Y must be 
picked and fuzzy subsets of these variables defined. 
(ii) Fuzzy rule identification. Relate the output sets to the input sets by identifying fuzzy 
rules. 
(iii) Fuzzification. For a given input x, calculate each rule’s ( i R ) antecedent strength as a 
fuzzy membership function  ()





(iv) Rule output evaluation. Modify the output sets of each rule according to the 
correlation-product inference rule  ()()
ii RiB yy mwm =￿ . 
(v) Defuzzification. Conceptually, the approach is to form an output fuzzy set via the 
fuzzy union of individual rule outputs and then find its centroid (as in Figure 2). For 
particular cases, it is equivalent and computationally easier to defuzzify each rule 
output first and then combine the resulting crisp outputs So we perform centroid 



































     (6) 
The system output is then calculated by a membership-weighted sum of each rule’s 









     (7) 
There are many other prescriptions for fuzzification, rule evaluation, and defuzzification; 
however, the technique presented here is the widely used and easy to analyze.
11  
                                                 
11 The computational procedure for defuzzification explained above relies on the fact that we use correlation-
product inference which also avoids the computation of integrals (assuming the fuzzy set centroids are known). 
Kosko (1997, p. 50) is a good reference for formal treatment of the Standard Additive Model (SAM) . Klir and 
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Figure 2. Fuzzy system architecture. 
 
 
From inference to approximating dynamical systems 
The same system presented in the previous subsection can be viewed as approximating the 
function that represents the true input-output relationship for the system in question. Additive 
fuzzy systems  :
np F ￿ﬁ￿  can uniformly approximate any continuous function 
:
np fU ￿￿ﬁ￿ assuming the domain U is closed and bounded (compact) (Kosko, 1997 
p.127).  This important result, known as the Fuzzy Approximation Theorem (FAT), can be 
understood intuitively if one considers that rules define fuzzy patches in the input-output 
space which are meant to cover the functions graph. The approximation tends to improve as 
the fuzzy rule patches grow in number and shrink in size as in Figure 3. 
If  A1 then B1 
If  A2 then B2 
.  .  . 














Figure 3. Fuzzy function approximation: patches in input-output space 
 
Additive fuzzy systems average the patches that overlap by adding them. Then a centroid (or 
other operation) converts the patch cover to the function  :
np F ￿ﬁ￿ . It has been proved 
(Kosko 1997, pp 80) that all centroidal fuzzy systems F compute a conditional mean: 
()[|] FxEYXx == . An additive fuzzy system splits this global conditional mean into a 
convex sum of local (rule) conditional means. The fuzzy system F does not use a math model 
of the system or function f that it tries to approximate. In this respect, F is a model-free 
statistical estimator; however, fuzzy systems implicitly implement a piecewise-linear 




The Economic Model  
 
Consider a firm, with a given technology, facing fluctuating prices for its output. 
Following Dixit (1997), we assume that adjustment costs underlie the dynamics of the firm’s 
factor demands. This problem has been traditionally addressed using optimal control 
                                                 
12 In its most generic formulation, a “learning machine” is capable of implementing a set of functions  ) , ( y x f , 
chosen a priori, before the formal inference process is begun (with parameters y indexing the set of functions). 
In the case of a  standard parametric regression, the set of functions implemented may be 
￿ =
i
i x x f y y) , ( . This approach can be used to characterize other techniques, such as non-parametric 
regressions,  Fourier series, classification problems, clustering, and density estimation (Cherkassky and Mulier, 
1998). All these techniques can be characterized by a taxonomy known as “dictionary methods” (Friedman, 
1994), where a method is specified by given set of basis functions. For a characterization of fuzzy systems as a 





techniques (either deterministic or stochastic) to solve for dynamic investment and 
employment decisions assuming adjustment costs are incurred by firms that change their 
capital stock and/or labor base. Dixit (1997) shows that, with linear adjustment costs, the 
dynamics exhibit a region of inaction. No adjustment is made unless its marginal value is 
sufficiently high. The introduction of uncertainty broadens this region of inaction. Dixit also 
identifies the characteristics of the boundary separating action from inaction, and considers 
what action should be taken in different sub-regions of the input space (Figure 4). This 
classification lends itself to an alternative representation as a FAM system, where the firm 
follows a set of rules that may or may not identify an optimal solution according to the 
Bellman formulation of the optimal control problem. The rules will reflect the technology 
available to the firm, and indicate regions of action and inaction linked to a price-responsive 
supply rule. The framework can be extended to include rules that consider systemic factors, 
such as interest rates or recession signals. 
 Although Dixit was the source of inspiration for the application in this paper, we do 
not address the issue of contemporaneous adjustment of both capital and labor. For this paper 
we address the simpler problem of single factor adjustment. We investigate, as do Nickell 
(1978) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990), employment dynamics with hiring and firing costs 
while holding capital constant (implicitly assuming that the costs of adjusting the capital 











Figure 4 Inaction region and action boundaries (Dixit, 1997). 
The variables l and k are the log-linear transformation of labor and capitol demanded  
Invest 
but Fire 

















by the firm assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
For clarity and tractability, it is easier to address single factor adjustments. In principle, 
however, the framework presented here could incorporate Dixit’s full model. A further 
deviation from Dixit’s approach is that we assume quadratic adjustment costs so as to force 
regularity on the sample generated by the optimal control model. 
The variables considered in this application are: 
• DPX: the change in price relative to the initial price condition (for normalization), 
and is specified as a moving average from t-1 to t+1 and centered around t; 
• ADJC: adjustment cost of hiring or firing labor (unit cost of hiring and firing are 
assumed equal for presentational purposes) 
• FDGAP: expresses the factor demand gap between current employment and static 
equilibrium employment as a share of current employment given current prices; a 
negative FDGAP entails the firm has an excess of employees if current prices were to 
persist. 










Figure 5. Membership function for labor adjustment cost  
We partition the variable space using 4 overlapping sets for the non-negative variable ADJC, 











have both positive or negative values.  The membership functions are triangular except for 
those partitions representing the extrema. Figure 5 shows the membership functions for the 
partitions zero (ZE), positive small (PS), positive medium (PM), and positive large (PL).  
Table 1 presents, for each fuzzy set, the point where the membership function peaks and 
the range (centered around the peak) over which the membership is non-zero. For example, 
the membership of the fuzzy set representing negative medium (NM) change in demand for 
labor (DLAB) peaks when DLAB takes on a value of –0.062 and  has non-zero membership 
in a range of –0.037 around the peak. The procedure to define the sets’ support was simple: 
we took the range for each variable (as in Figure 5) as being defined by the minimum and 
maximum values in the data set and then divided this range and assigned each support 
requiring that the more far away from the origin, the wider the support (ZE is very tight 
compared to PL).    










Neg. Large     (NL)  -0.256  +0.110        -0.381  +0.169  -0.111  +0.049 
Neg. Medium (NM)  -0.142  –0.085        -0.212  –0.127  -0.062  –.0.037 
Neg. Small    (NS)  -0.057  –0.057        -0.085  –0.085  -0.025  ±0.025 
Zero              (ZE)  0  –0.028     0  –0.108        0  –.0.072  0  –0.022 
Pos. Small    (PS)  0.057  –..0570  0.215  –0.215  0.143  –0.143  0.045  –0.045 
Pos. Medium (PM)  0.142  –0.085  0.538  –0.323  0.358  –..215  0.112  –.0.067 
Pos. Large     (PL)  0.256  -0.114  0.969  -0.431  0.644  -0.286  0.201  -0.089 
Note on units: DPX  is a  proportional change of price relative to the initial price condition; ADJC is the 
adjustment cost normalized relative to initial adjustment cost; DLAB and FDGAP are expressed as a 
proportional change  relative to the current values of employment and static equilibrium employment. 
Table 1. description of the membership functions for all input and output variables 
We assume that, from a procedural perspective, decisions are made according to a set of 
rules. Agents distinguish between a transient state in which prices are fluctuating and a 
stationary state for which DPX is zero or very close to zero. If prices are fluctuating, the firm 
decides whether to hire or fire employees based on the price derivative and the adjustment 
costs associated with hiring/firing. If prices are not changing, the firm calculates its static 





what to do based on the gap between the two (FDGAP). We are therefore considering the 
following types of rules: 
(i) For the transient states in which prices are not stationary: If     DPX is Positive Small (PS) 
and ADJC is Zero (ZE)  then   DLAB is Positive Small (PS)  
(ii) For the stationary states: If     FDGAP is Neg. Large (NL) and ADJC is Pos. Small (PS)  
then   DLAB is Neg Medium (NM) 
This approach is consistent with Heiner (1989) where conditions are derived for 
“imperfect” agents in a dynamic setting to converge to an optimal target. The necessary and 
sufficient conditions were obtained by allowing that agents cannot follow a sufficiently 
erratic optimal target 
*
t x without error, and they form an estimate of its true position  ˆ t x called 
the perceived target. There are an infinite number of ways in which the perceived target can 
be defined to approximate optimal decisions: rules of thumb, imitation, extrapolation, and so 
on.  In this paper, we distinguished between transient and stationary states of nature to which 
the imperfect agent reacts. We will see that the stationary FAM obtained through estimation 
will satisfy the main requirement for a dynamic system to converge to optimality, the 
requirement being that the action taken by the agent (FAM) is a partial adjustment toward the 
perceived optimal location. 
 To estimate rules, we first  must have a sample. To address all the issues mentioned 
above, we construct a very special sample that is as consistent as possible with the positivist 
economics approach. We are trying to see if simple rules can replicate “as if” optimizing 
behavior; therefore, we start from a sample obtained by running the optimal control problem 
under different product price scenarios, which provides an ideal testing ground. If it cannot 
be done with such a sample, it probably cannot be done with real world data. In the next 
section, we present the optimal control model used to generate the sample and the estimation 
process that was used.  
 
Sample Generation and the Estimation of Behavioral Rules  
 





foresight firm. This sample is used to “train” a FAM system with no a priori knowledge of 
the rules. The objective of the exercise is to examine if the rule-based system can effectively 
mimic optimal, perfect-foresight behavior, and if so, under what circumstances. 
Conceptually, we can interpret the FAM training process as an agent applying Heiner’s 
reliability condition in deciding which rules to adopt.  The general specification of the 
































Łł ￿    (9) 
                     ,1,, ftftft FDFDFADJ + =+   Factor Stock Equation of Motion             (10) 
                    ( )
2
,, ftfft ADJCfhFADJ ‡￿  Quadratic Adjustment Costs             (11) 
 
where   t PX   = product price   t X   = production 
, ft FD   = factor demand   , ft WF   = factor wage 
, ft FADJ  = factor adjustment    , ft ADJC  = factor adjustment cost 
 
We obtained the sample by providing the following 16 price paths to the optimal control 
version of the problem. One set of price paths was constructed to capture the reaction of the 
optimal control model to shocks allowing for an adjustment period (Figure 6a) while a 




































































(a)        (b) 
Figure 6. Price paths imposed on optimal control model to obtain training sample. 
 
 Since we assume that the firm responds to adjustment costs, we ran the optimal control 
model using these price paths for 8 different values of labor adjustment costs in a range from 
0.04 to 1.0 dollars per labor “unit” (we are assuming capital stock is fixed).
13 Wages are 
fixed at a value of 1 for both capital and labor, therefore an adjustment cost of 1 is high. The 
sample was obtained with 128 runs of the optimal control model over a 24 period time 
horizon (the time period can be viewed as a month for our purposes). More detail on the data 
generation process is available in the data appendix. 
We estimated the FAM rules by adopting an unsupervised learning technique in which no 
distinction is made between input and output components of the training data (in contrast to 
supervised learning that does make the distinction). The objective is to approximate the 
unknown distribution that gave rise to the training sample using a small number of prototype 
vectors  { } 12 ,,..., m Cccc =  with m much smaller than the training sample size. The 
distribution is approximated by a collection of points (prototypes). The method adopted, 
called vector quantization (VQ), aims at minimizing a well-defined approximation 
(quantization) error when the number of prototypes m is fixed a priori. Vector quantization 
arose from the need to encode vectors in order to transmit them over digital communication 
channels (Gray, 1984; Shannon, 1959).  The sample generation and the rule estimation were 
                                                 





both implemented with the GAMS software (Brooke et al., 1998). 
Since we assume that the firm reacts differently when prices are fluctuating as compared 
to when they are stationary, we divided the sample in two according to this criterion. We then 
proceeded to estimate one FAM for the transient and one for the stationary case. The vector 
quantizer adopted to estimate each FAM is a mapping of 3-dimensional Euclidean space 
3 R into a finite subset C of 
3 R . Thus 
3 : QRC ￿￿ﬁ  where  { } 12 ,,..., m Cccc =  with 
3
j cRj ˛"  
We associate the m point quantizer in 
3 R  with a partition such that the regions defining it 
are non-overlapping and their union is the universe of discourse (in our case a subset of 
3 R ). 
In our case,  j c takes on all values for which our fuzzy classes have maximum membership. 
We performed repeated sampling among the 3,072 sample points (128x24) obtained for 
training, to obtain 25,000 points and assigned each one to an element of C by determining the 
j c for which the sampled point obtained the highest membership.
14  
 The economic justification of this procedure is intuitively provided by Heiner’s result 
that behavioral rules arise because of uncertainty in distinguishing preferred from less-
preferred actions. Assume the estimation represents the process by which a totally ignorant 
firm manager who has recently entered the  business tries to understand when labor should be 
hired or fired based on price changes of the product produced by the firm. The sample can be 
viewed as data from the firm’s successful competitors (success being a reasonable 
assumption in our case given the data were generated using a perfect foresight, optimal 
control model). Then the quantization process, by associating input-output regions that are 
found to most probably contain the actions of successful competitors, identifies reliable rules.  
Given the particular nature of our sample, we can even use the reliability condition 
(Heiner, 1983). The question is to determine when the selection of an action is sufficiently 
reliable for an agent to benefit from allowing flexibility to select the action. We define g(e) 
                                                 
14 This is a very elementary approach to a problem that has been studied extensively (see Gersho and Gray, 
1992). The plain and basic approach used here ignores the necessary conditions for optimal vector quantizer 
design. The reason for such oversight is that we are interested in keeping this part as simple as possible for two 
reasons: (i) the simpler the rule estimation process, the more credible the fact that agents can identify such rules 
(different objective from designing an optimal signal processing system), and (ii) the focus of this paper is to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the rule-based approach as a whole rather than focus on technical issues that can 





as the gain from selecting the action when it is indeed preferred; l(e) as the loss from 
selecting it under the wrong conditions (where e represents the state of nature);  right 
conditions for taking the action occur with probability  () e p , which are correctly recognized 
with probability r(U) (where U represents uncertainty faced by the agent); finally, the 
probability of taking the action at the wrong time is w(U). Following the above notation, 









>￿  (12) 
We next present, in terms of the variables to be adopted by the fuzzy system, the sample 
that was used to train the FAM rule based system. In Figure 7(a) the sample used to train the 
transient FAM rule was obtained by selecting all sample elements with fuzzy membership for 
non-zero values of DPX, while the remaining part of the sample (with DPX having 
membership in the fuzzy set ZE) was used to estimate the stationary FAM rule (Figure 7(b)).  
In Figure 6(a) the sample is presented in three dimensions with the price’s rate of change 
(DPX) and the adjustment costs (ADJC) as input and the change in labor force as output, 
while in Figure 7(b) the inputs are adjustment costs (ADJC) and difference in labor demand 
(FDGAP) relative to a static optimum. One can see in both cases that the surface 
approximating the sample data is neither a plane nor other simple surface used in global 
estimation procedures. Without a reliable functional description (obtained either from theory 
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(a)        (b) 
Figure 7. Data sample generated using the optimal control model. 
 
To understand the economic intuition of the rule estimation process, consider a two-
dimensional world (for presentational purposes) and assume one input (DPX) and one output 
(DLAB) as in Figure 8(a). This allows us to link the reliability condition to the vector 
quantization process: the diagonally-shaded rectangle (assuming that the space was 
partitioned in rectangles as presented in Figure 8a) would be chosen by the VQ process as 
associating a change in price in the range [0.1,0.2] with a proportional change in labor force 
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(a)        (b) 
Figure 8. A two-dimensional cut of the sample spaces for the FAM rules 
In this context, assume the input space to be partitioned over index i and the output space 
over index j, so that we can represent a rule partition by a set R(i ,j)  associating input 
neighborhoods to output neighborhoods. R(i ,j) contains all possible rule associations; for any 
input partition Pi  we denote R*(i,j) as the “winning rule”, signifying the output partition Qj 
has the highest number of sample elements for the given input partition. For convenience we 
define  (,) i
j
PRij = U  and  (,) j
i
QRij = U  to represent, respectively, the i-th input and the j-th 






= U  describing, 
for each output partition j, the  region in input-output space that will be categorized by the 
“winning rules” as belonging, in output, to the Qj neighborhood. Then the components of the 
reliability condition can be expressed as:  
j number of sample elements in Q
()
total sample size
j e p =   (13) 
i
j
number of sample elements in R*(i,j)
()
number of sample elements in Q
j rU =
U




number of sample elements in P*(i,j)R*(i ,j)
(U)
number of sample elements inP*(i,j)
w
Øø ˙ ºß = U
U





It is important to remember that the action, in Heiner’s sense, is given in our framework by 
the value of the output variable (this is why the LHS of equations 13-15 are indexed over j).  
Equation (13) expresses the probability that an action in the range of output partition Qj is 
warranted. Once the “winning” rules have been chosen, the probability of our set of rules 
correctly recognizing that, in fact, action in the range of output partition Qj is required is 
expressed in Equation (14). Finally, Equation (15) considers the probability of our rules 
incorrectly choosing an action in the Qj range as depending on the sample points that fall in 
the input domain of the rules that choose Qj but whose output value is not in the Qj range 
(numerator) and on all the sample points that fall in the input domain of the rules that choose 
Qj (denominator). 
While l(e) and g(e) cannot be deduced from the diagram,  supposedly the firm 
manager has a vague idea about the order of magnitude of the gain from a correct decision 
and the opportunity cost of an incorrect decision. Define the operator  (,) Rij  as representing 
the number of sample elements in partition R(i,j). We can therefore manipulate the reliability 









>￿  (16) 
Assuming a fixed environment (e) and uncertainty faced by the agent (U), we index over 
the output partition (since each output variable range is associated with a different action), 




 P*(i,j)R*(i,j) Q P ()
1










This can be viewed by the “learning” manager, if the sample comes from real world data, 
as an indication of trade-offs associated with actions.
15 More precisely, if successful 
competitors are adopting an action, then the ratio g(e)/l(e)  must be favorable to this action, 
                                                 
15 Inequality 17 expresses a global criterion for a rule set. An alternative, local expression that applies to single 
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 which is obtained by calculating  ,,, , ,and  ijijij rw p  when restricting the 
sample size to include only those elements whose input values are included in partition i.  Inequality 17 is a 





which means it must be at least as good as the right-hand-side (which the “learning” can 
compute).
16 The intuition we can derive from this expression is that the more widely 
scattered the sample elements the higher must be the g(e)/l(e)  ratio for an action to be 
undertaken. 
 
The stationary and the transient FAMs obtained with this method are presented below. 
Stationary FAM 
• As adjustment costs decrease, the firm will tend to move faster toward a stationary 
equilibrium solution. 
• If adjustment costs are very high, you may want to hire but you never fire. 
• There is a relatively large region of inaction for positive values of FDGAP, implying 
that if adjustment costs are medium to high, the firm may never reach the stationary 
equilibrium position.  
                                                 
16 Although the expression obtained is complicated to read, it is quite easy to compute with the division 





    Table 2. Stationary FAM 
Adjustment Costs   
ZE  PS  PM  PL 
NL  NL  NM  NS  ZE 
NM  NL  NM  NS  ZE 
NS  NS  NS  ZE  ZE 
ZE  ZE  ZE  ZE  ZE 
PS  PS  PS  ZE  ZE 







PL      PS  PS 
 
Transient FAM 
• The area of inaction is relatively small. 
• Higher adjustment costs dampen the reaction to price changes. 
• There is a large area for which a small increase in labor force is the decision (+5%). 
    Table 3. Transient FAM 
Adjustment Costs   
ZE  PS  PM  PL 
NL  NL  NM  NS  NS 
NM  NM  NM  NS  ZE 
NS  NS  NS  ZE  ZE 
ZE  ---------  ---------  ---------  --------- 
PS  PS  PS  PS  PS 





























































The surfaces presented in Figure 9 represent the estimated FAMs with the inputs on the 
horizontal axes and the output labor decision on the vertical axis. These can be compared 
with Figure 7, which showed all the elements in the original sample (before doing repeated 
sampling) used in the estimation process. The end result of the estimation bears a good 
resemblance to the sample. 
An important observation is that the change in labor demand in percentage terms is always 
less than the perceived target to reach a stationary solution (FDGAP), implying a partial 
adjustment process as required by Heiner (1989) to guarantee convergence to an equilibrium 
optimal  solution. However, given the nature of our problem, at high adjustment costs, the 
FAM may never converge to the static optimum solution because of the presence of a region 
of inaction (Heiner assumes that partial adjustment is strictly non-zero, and at higher 
adjustment costs we violate this hypothesis). This is a different issue from the fact that it 
may, in fact, not be dynamically optimal to converge to the static equilibrium as pointed out 





































































































FAM Performance in Predicting System Behavior 
 
To test how the FAM performed tracking the system it was designed for, we chose 
four price paths: the first two paths simulate smooth business cycles, while the third and 
fourth represent, respectively, a permanent price increase and decrease. The test is performed 
assuming a low (0.15)  adjustment cost. 
 
(a) PATH 1 
 
(a) PATH 2 
Figure 10. Business cycle price paths and comparison of FAM and optimal labor demand 
PATH 1 and PATH 2 represent cycles with different frequencies 
  
The results show that the FAM performs well in both the business cycle situation and the 
permanent change scenarios (Figures 10 & 11). Figure 10 shows that the FAM at low 































































































labor demand by the firm is well replicated. 
The permanent price change scenario is tracked very precisely by the FAM, as can be seen 
in Figure 11.  The FAM performs slightly better in the price increase scenario than in the 
price decrease one. 
 
(a) PATH 3 
(b) PATH 4 
Figure 11. Permanent real price changes and comparison of FAM and optimal labor demand 
PATH 3 and PATH 4 represent permanent increase and decrease respectively 
 
The first objective, to show that an appropriately trained rule-based system can behave as 
if it were an optimizing agent, has been accomplished at least in conditions of smooth price 
changes. Having established that there is consistency with the data for both the rule-based 
and the optimizing agent approaches (the latter by construction), in the next section we 






Rules and Optimality Under Noisy Conditions 
  
We now analyze the behavior of the FAM in the presence of differing degrees of 
noise, and compare it to the solution of a perfect foresight, optimal control solution. The 
comparison is made from the firm manager’s perspective (who adopts the rules) by 
examining the difference in net present value of the flow of profits throughout the whole 


















Figure 12. Geometric comparison of FAM vs. Optimal Performance 
 
Figure 12 gives a geometric description of the measures we use to represent the performance 
of the FAM system relative to that of the optimal control system. The diagram plots the net 
present value of the flow of income from the optimal control solution on the x-axis (VO) and 




















xy-plane comparing these two values. The point (VDO ,VDF) represents the net present value 
for the optimal solution and the FAM solution in a deterministic, no-noise environment. The 
45° line describes situations in which the FAM performs as well as the optimal control 
model. The half-plane above the 45° line is empty because the FAM can never outperform 
what is a de facto rational expectations model. In fact, the no-noise FAM solution is slightly 
below the 45° line, as would be expected. 
An obvious measure that comes to mind for comparing performance of the two systems is 
the Net Worth Gap (NWG) expressed as the difference in Net Present Value between the 
optimal solution and the FAM solution. In Figure 12 the minimum distance from the 45° line 
to the point (VO ,VF), or d,  represents the net worth gap (normalized by a factor of  2 ).
17 
Problems arise with the NWG as a measure of performance because its value is unchanged 
for all solutions that fall on a parallel line with 45° slope. The NWG does therefore not take 
into consideration the baseline net worth of the firm, implicitly ignoring that losing a million 
dollars is very different when it happens to a family business rather than to a multi-national 
corporation.  
To prevent the shortcomings of the NWG as a measure of performance, we can normalize 
it relative to the net worth of the firm. A first option is to define a norm, NORGAP, as the 
minimum distance (d) of the point from the 45° line over the distance from the origin (r).
18 It 
is therefore equivalent to taking the sine of the angle (a) between the radial through the point 
and the 45% line (Sine(a) is always positive in the interval (0,180)). The larger the value of 
the norm, the worse the performance of the FAM. Comparing the points along the half-circle 
with radius r, the FAM performs most poorly when passing the perpendicular to the 45% 
line. In this situation the value of the norm equals one (d=r) and the optimal control model 
has a positive NPV while the FAM has a negative NPV of the same magnitude. 
An alternative measure of performance can also be introduced by normalizing NWG 
relative to the noise-induced deviation from the deterministic solution obtained in the 
absence of noise. Such a measure, that we call “Deviation Gap” (DEVGAP), can be obtained 
                                                 
17 From the geometric representation we obtain that 
2




18 Given the tuple (VO , VF ) associated with a stochastic price scenario, the Euclidean distance r represents the 





as the minimum distance (d
l ) of a point from the 45° line passing through the deterministic 
solution over the distance from the deterministic solution (r
l).
19 It is equivalent to taking the 
sine of the angle b.  The sign of the DEVGAP measure is amenable to interpretation: a 
negative value of DEVGAP for a tuple (VO ,VF)  signals that the FAM performance, in the 
presence of noise, comes closer to optimality than in the deterministic case;  conversely, a 
positive sign  implies that the FAM is further from optimal behavior.  In the discussion that 
follows, both NORGAP and DEVGAP are used as measures of performance and the results 
according to these two measures are compared. 
Figure 13 plots the net present value according to the approach just discussed. We observe 
that the performance of the FAM in the presence of noise depends on the different price 
paths. 
                                                 
19 Given the tuple (VO , VF ) associated with a stochastic price scenario, the Euclidean distance r
l represents the 





Path1       Path2 
 
 
Path3      Path4 
.  
Figure 13. NPV ($) comparison of FAM vs. Optimal performance (x-axis: optimal, y-axis FAM) 
 
When the price signal is corrupted by noise, the best approach for understanding the 
different performance of the FAM relative to the optimal control case for each price path is to 
construct a measure of the magnitude of the noise relative to the signal. The simplest 





how it affects the performance of the FAM. In Figure 14, we present the Net Worth Gap 
normalized relative the distance from the origin (NORGAP). On the x-axis is the standard 
deviation of the noise process affecting our price signal while on the y-axis we have the mean 
value of d/r and the 95% confidence interval for the mean. 
 The results show that the business cycle cases deviate more from optimality as a 
whole than do the permanent price change scenarios (Figures 14 and 15). This result is due to 
the fact that the deterministic starting point for the “permanent change” price scenarios are 
far away from the origin in the geometric representation (and close to the 45% degree line); 
therefore, the extent to which the FAM deviates from optimality is attenuated by the large 
value of r. 
Path 1                         Path 2 
Figure 14. The 95% confidence interval for the normalized net worth gap ratio (NORGAP) at 
different standard deviations (Business cycle scenarios) 
126 128 131 136 141 142 142 144 143 148 N =
Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path





































116 120 129 134 136 140 137 133 138 143 N =
Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path









































The results also show, as expected, a trend toward greater deviation from optimality as the 
variance increases. Although no general statement can be made, the threshold effect present 
in the response to Path1 is of interest in understanding where the as if optimizing hypothesis 
may break down in the presence of noise. More precisely, we notice that for a standard 
deviation up to 0.1 the FAM performs in a 5% range from optimality, but rapidly deteriorates 
to a 15-20% deviation  from optimal behavior as the standard deviation increases.  
The difference between the FAM response in the two permanent price change scenarios 
can be attributed again to the relative distance of the deterministic NPV from the origin being 
much higher in the case of the upward price adjustment case.  
Path 3                         Path 4 
 
Figure 15. The 95% confidence interval for the normalized net worth gap ratio (NORGAP)  at 
different standard deviations  (permanent price change scenarios) 
 
The results look very different if, instead, we adopt the deterministic case as a 
counterfactual. Below we present the measure obtained relative to the deterministic solution 
(DEVGAP). From Figures 16 and 17 we observe, as the noise level increases, a general 
tendency for the rule-based method to become a better approximation of optimal behavior if 
the reference point is taken to be the deterministic solution. At low variance levels, the FAM 
appears to be very sensitive to noise: a DEVGAP value of 0.6 implies an angle of 47￿ 
130 128 129 129 131 138 137 135 140 144 N =
Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path





































46 48 57 64 70 55 68 73 79 118 N =
Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path











































relative to the reference line at 45￿, which implies that either the optimal response is shifting 
and the FAM is not following, or the FAM is overreacting to the noise and the optimal 
response remains close to deterministic (reasoning is based on Figure 10, assuming the 
deterministic solution is now the origin: an angle of 45￿ to the 45￿ line implies that we are 
moving either along the x-axis or the y-axis). As it turns out (as we will see from analyzing 
the labor response), the FAM is overreacting at low noise levels. What is quite extraordinary 
is the relative improvement in performance as the noise level increases for the scenarios 
found to be sensitive at low noise. This result is in stark contrast with the preceding analysis 
centered around zero NPV as origin.  
 An exception to the relative improvement of the FAM rules under noisy conditions is 
given by the second of the business cycle scenarios (PATH2 in Figure 16). What 
distinguishes this scenario from the others is the relatively poor performance of the FAM 
solution in the deterministic case compared to the optimal. This means the point (VDO ,VDF) 
is further away from the 45￿ line bisecting the x-y plane than for the other scenarios.  The 
negative value intervals for DEVGAP at low noise levels indicate an improvement in 
absolute terms of FAM performance expressed by (VO ,VF) being closer to the 45￿ line  than 
the deterministic solution (VDO ,VDF) .  
What is the economic intuition behind the results according to the different measures? It 
appears that in absolute monetary terms, if the deterministic FAM solution is close to 
optimal, the performance of the FAM deteriorates as noise increases. However, the 
deterioration, relative to normal deterministic conditions, is less than proportional to the 
increase in noise. Stated differently, the more unpredictable are prices, the more robust the 
rule-based system becomes by moving away from “deterministic normality” in a direction 
that, on average, tends towards optimality. In a very noisy environment, there is an upper 
limit to how much the FAM will stray from optimality. This is best seen in Figure 16 where 
at high noise levels the 95% confidence interval is in the range (0,0.2) meaning the angle b is 






Path 1                         Path 2 
Figure 16.  The 95% confidence interval for the  net worth gap ratio normalized relative 
to the no-noise net worth (DEVGAP)  at different standard deviations (Business cycle)  
In Figure 17 we observe, as the noise level increases, that the FAM solution  becomes a 
better approximation of optimal behavior if the reference point is taken to be the 
deterministic solution; however, the upper limit in terms of FAM deviation is different in the 
two cases shown. In the first case (PATH3)  the noise is superimposed over a permanent 
price increase while in the second case (PATH4) the same noise is superimposed over a 
permanent price decrease. The difference between the two price scenarios leads to different 
signal-to-noise ratios which affect the performance of the FAM system.    
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Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path


















































Path 3                         Path 4  
Figure 17.  The 95% confidence interval for the net worth gap ratio normalized relative to the 
no-noise net worth (DEVGAP)  at different standard deviations (permanent price change)  
 
To support the above conclusion, we can observe the average labor demand (average over 
the time periods) for the FAM and the optimal solutions. In Figure 18, the two extreme cases, 
with standard deviation 0.025 and 0.25, are plotted. At low standard deviations, the 
distribution of the solutions is nearly vertical, implying that the FAM adjusts when it should 
not  (to achieve optimality).  When the variance is high, labor demand deviates substantially 
from the deterministic case, but the distribution of this deviation approaches the 45￿ line 
relative to the low variance deviation.  
130 128 129 129 131 138 137 135 140 144 N =
Standard deviation of noise imposed on price path
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Average of optimal labor demand (labor units)
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Path 3                     Path 4 
 
 
Figure 18. Average labor demand over time: comparing low and high variance results 
 
The variation in labor demand seems to indicate that the similarity between rule-based 
Average optimal labor demand (labor units)
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behavior and optimal behavior in terms of NPV does not carry over into the labor 
hiring/firing decisions. The reason this result occurs is that objective functions are often quite 
flat in the neighborhood of optimal solutions, implying that while the NPV changes little 
even with high noise, the labor demand patterns may deviate substantially, even with 





In the context of the literature on bounded rationality, this paper presents a novel 
empirical approach using fuzzy systems control theory. The main objective is to evaluate the 
performance of such an approach relative to methods that adopt explicit optimization 
techniques to describe agent behavior (as-if-optimizers). A secondary objective is to develop 
a framework that lends itself to applied research in situations where standard methods do not 
perform satisfactorily. In the proposed approach, the “economic agent” uses believably 
simple rules in coping with complex situations, and these rules can be estimated. The paper 
uses concepts and methods from fuzzy control theory usually employed in electrical 
engineering applications. 
The approach taken is to generate a sample that would stack the cards in favor of 
optimization methods by using a sample generated by a perfect foresight, optimal control 
model. After illustrating that even in such an extreme situation the estimated rules could 
satisfactorily replicate the underlying optimizing behavior, we proceeded by presenting the 
interesting features of rule-based behavior in the presence of noise by comparing it to optimal 
solutions in the same situation. The results indicate sensitivity of the rule-based system at 
low noise levels (with labor demand deviating from optimal without, however, much impact 
on NPV). At higher noise levels, there is a further, but less than proportional, deviation from 
optimal labor demand and it does affect NPV substantially. 
The first objective, to show that an appropriately trained rule-based system can behave as 
if it were an optimizing agent, is accomplished. Having established that there is very close 
consistency with the data for both the rule-based and the optimizing-agent approaches (with 





option in a variety of situations. First, we argue that the approach is a “simpler” 
representation of the firm’s operation because it is based on a very simple and 
straightforward analysis (as put forth by Heiner) concerning the economic motivation for rule 
adoption. The simple learning process described in this paper is consistent with Alchian’s 
view that behavior should be based on actions that have been tried by at least some economic 
agents in the past, given that identifying possible action is in itself a process. Furthermore, 
the method proposed here requires only local knowledge about prices by requiring only a 
forecast of prices two periods into the future instead of knowledge of the whole price path.
20 
The second, and more interesting point of argumentation concerns how “fruitful” the rule-
based approach is found to be. The main advantage is that the theory can yield predictions in 
a wider domain of applications for which the as if optimization framework does not apply, 
such as  
1. fluctuating situations in which the agents do not have the time to learn the optimizing 
behavior (assuming the FAM captures the “real” dynamic behavior); 
2. applications for which the data come in qualitative form, for example, from surveys 
describing the confidence of entrepreneurs in local institutions; 
3. linking the approach to game theory to analyze institutions, their rules, and the impact 
of introducing new rules. 
Finally, we believe this approach could be the starting point for further empirical research 
on the interaction between rule-based agents, the micro-foundations of macroeconomics, the 
validation of competing models in economics, and the analysis of how rules are generated. 
 Along with advantages and interesting applications, there are some considerable 
disadvantages that come with the rule-based approach: (i) all the standard tools of the 
optimization framework are precluded; including the use of shadow prices, general results 
concerning markets, and the strong normative prescriptions that have been developed in 
neoclassical economics; (ii) dropping the hypothesis of explicit optimizing agents requires a 
substantial data set to estimate behavioral rules. 
 Given the introductory nature of this paper, it leaves much room for future 
                                                 
20 Obviously,  the optimization problem could be solved repeatedly with a time horizon of two periods, 
requiring the same amount of  knowledge as the FAM ; however, optimal control models are very sensitive to 





extensions. The estimation procedure for the rules can be improved  by applying more 
advanced methods that are already available in the literature (Gersho and Gray, 1992). The 
learning process can be represented as occurring over time rather than as a static estimation 
process. This can be done following the approaches adopted in the “classifier systems” 
literature using genetic algorithms (Holland and Miller, 1991) and the innovative methods of 
evolutionary game theory (Marimon, 1993). Another potentially fruitful area is to investigate 
convergence of a FAM system to equilibrium solutions in more complex applications. 
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Appendix: Parameters of Optimal Control Model used for Sample Generation  
 
 
Initial condition factor demand  "", 0 labort FD   = 30 units of labor  
      "" 0 capitalt FD  = 70 units of capital 
Initial output                  X0         = 100 units 
Wages (labor, capital)    , ft WF   = 1  
discount rate              r   = 0.003  per period 
 
The optimal control model was run using the price paths presented in Figure 6 and with the 
following set of adjustment costs: 
unit hiring/firing costs for labor       0.06    0.11    0.15    0.35   0.5    0.65   0.82   1.0 
The costs of hiring and firing are assumed equal.  
The sample generated will depend strongly on the discount rate and the factor intensity of the 
production technology. In the application presented here the technology is capital intensive 
and this may affect the results, both in terms of the rules that are estimated and the relative 
performance of the rule-based system relative to optimal.  
After the rules were estimated, all the runs were carried out using a hiring/firing unit 
adjustment cost of 0.15 (for labor). Capital stock was fixed to 70 units in the sample 
generation, the estimation, and the simulations.IFPRI 
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